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ABSTRACT: When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted 
with a puzzling situation: What seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well 
be called a vice in another. This talk will present the idea that there are in fact two roles an arguer 
has to master – and with them four sometimes very different sets of virtues. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Thinking about the virtues an arguer should possess, we might be tempted to just 
expect one simple list. Perhaps we imagine that it will contain such character-traits 
as fairness, intelligence, thoroughness etc. What we do not consider, however, is 
that an ideal arguer might have to possess virtues that at first sight look contrary to 
each other. In this paper, I will claim that exactly this is the case. I will argue that the 
Good that the virtuous arguer is fit to accomplish is the bettering of belief-systems 
and that there are two very different views on what behavior will accomplish this 
Good – the adversarial and the cooperative ideal of argumentation. Both views can 
present very good arguments for their approach and both have convincing reasons 
for the claim that the respective other is not appropriate or lacking in a significant 
way. Unfortunately, the virtues an arguer would have to possess to meet the 
requirements of one of the two approaches are contrary to the virtues he would 
have to have for the other. I will not choose between the two approaches, nor will I 
claim that one set of virtues is unnecessary or disadvantageous. Instead, I will claim 
that an arguer should possess both sets of virtue and use practical wisdom to decide 
which virtues should guide him in which argumentative situation. I will then 
propose and justify a criterion that can help an arguer in deciding whether he 
should be guided by cooperative or adversarial virtues: The amount of mutual 
understanding and appreciation of claims and arguments that has already been 
reached. 
 
2 THE GOOD OF THE ARGUER 
 
Opening a random introduction to virtue ethics, we will likely be confronted with a 
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story about knives.1 Knives, we are told, have the purpose of cutting. As a virtue is a 
disposition which is regularly acted on and that allows its bearer to succeed at 
his/its purpose, and the purpose of a virtue-bearer is to reach his/her/its specific 
good. The specific good of a knife is cutting well. The virtue of a knife will be those 
attributes that allows it to cut well. A knife, therefore, should be sharp, sturdy, have 
a handle that allows a steady grip etc. 
This story is supposed to explain to us what virtues are. Virtues are those 
dispositions that enable us to reach a certain Good. According to Aristotle, “[e]very 
art and every inquiry, every action and choice, seems to aim at some good; whence 
the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.” (Aristotle, 1973, p. 
1094a 1-3) 
The Good of the knife was cutting well. That is rather easy to determine. 
What we are interested in, however, is the Good of the arguer. “Well”, we could say, 
“that is just as easy: The Good of the arguer is arguing well.” However, having said 
that, we immediately see ourselves confronted with an ocean of problems. An 
arguer could argue for all kinds of reasons, and depending on those reasons, he 
could have very different goals. The goal of an arguer in one situation might be to 
persuade another at any cost, and in another situation to find the best solution to a 
problem. To argue well could mean very different activities, not all of which we 
would think ethically preferable.  
In order to escape this conundrum, we could reformulate our answer. We 
could say that the Good of an arguer is to further the Goods of argumentation. That 
promises a better outcome, for now we are able to ask ourselves a serious 
normative question: Why and when is argumentation a good thing? Aberdein, in his 
paper “Virtue in Argument” answered this question in terms of truth: 
Argumentation is supposed to spread true beliefs. (Aberdein, 2010, p. 173/174) For 
those of us that prefer to talk without reference to truth, we can weaken the claim a 
bit (and make it more vague): The good of argumentation is the bettering of belief 
systems.2 This sounds reasonable: The activity of engaging in argumentation is 
praiseworthy because it leads to the improvement of belief-systems; those of the 
arguers, those of the audience, those of the opponents. Getting mere belief closer to 
knowledge, that is the good of argumentation, that is what we hope to achieve by 
arguing. I think that this is also the reason why argumentation theorists make such 
an effort to make rules or definitions that prevent deceptive techniques when 
pursuing persuasion. This effort is the most obvious indication that the 
improvement of belief-systems is actually the good of argumentation. As Raphaél 
                                                        
1 Knives seem to be the favourite objects of virtue ethicists. For proof of this weird and perhaps a bit 
worrying preference type “virtue” and “knife” into google and you will get over 4 000 000 results. 
Examples of such introductions can be found in: Andre Comte-Sponville, A small treatise on great 
virtues, 2002, p.2; Douglas Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom, 2012, p.38; Michael Winter, Rethinking 
Virtue Ethics, 2012, p. 14 and many others. 
2 A belief-system can be by including more true beliefs and weeding out false ones, but also in other 
ways – for example by establishing stronger justificatory connections between already endorsed 
believes or by weeding out wrong justificatory connections between nonetheless true endorsed 
beliefs etc. 
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Micheli points out, the most often mentioned goal of argumentation is to persuade 
or convince another. (Micheli, 2012, p.116, 117) But, he continues, we often argue 
even though we cannot see a reasonable chance to convince the other, or even 
though the other shares our position – then we might just try to justify or test our 
position. (Micheli, 2012, p. 119ff) In addition, the goal someone might have while 
arguing is not the same as the good or goal of argumentation as a whole: One is the 
good that the arguer expects for himself in one instance of argumentation, the other 
is what we expect from argumentation as a phenomenon altogether. When we talk 
normatively about argumentation, about how we should argue, we will talk about 
how we can regulate argumentation so that it will help us achieve this goal as 
reliably as possible. That is what argumentation theorists are trying to find out. This 
far, at least a fair number of us might be able to agree.3  
How helpful is our result? Well, we can now formulate a rather vague 
definition of the virtuous arguer: The virtuous arguer is the arguer who is disposed 
(and regularly acts on this disposition) to engage in argumentation in such a way that 
his contribution will, overall, further the improvement of the belief-systems of those 
that participate in the argumentation or get influenced by the arguments made in it in 
some other way. 
Having come this far, we immediately find ourselves confronted with a new 
problem: People do not at all agree on how an arguer should behave in order to 
accomplish this. A bit of research reveals that there are at least two very different 
positions on what form of behavior will render the best results in improving belief-
systems. The first one promotes an arguer who engages in what has been labelled 
adversarial argumentation.4 The second one wants to see its arguers cooperative 
and helpful. Both present good arguments as to how their model-arguer will further 
the Good of argumentation. These arguments will be helpful in our inquiry. 
 
3 TWO MODELS OF THE IDEAL ARGUMENTATION5 
 
3.1 The adversarial ideal of argumentation 
 
The argument for promoting adversarial argumentation is based on the idea of the 
survival of the fittest. We can reconstruct the thought as follows: In nature, all 
individuals are in a competition for resources. The fittest individuals are the most 
successful and therefore also the ones that will be able to transfer their genetic 
information into the next generation of individuals. Similarly, in adversarial 
                                                        
3 This short attempt at a justification of the claim that the Good of argumentation is the bettering of 
belief-systems is far from conclusive and in order to defend it properly, a whole different paper 
would probably be required. I think that Aberdein made a rather good case for his truth-spreading-
claim, and as this one is not so different from his I will just rest on his work here. 
4 This name is used, for example, by Phillis Rooney, “Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation and 
Embattled Reason”, 2010 
5 I will here present the two ideal in their most radical form in order to make contrasting and 
comparing easy. I am aware that most theorists who commit themselves to one of them will have a 
much more sophisticated, nuanced and often much less drastic view.  
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argumentation, all claims and arguments are in competition for the adherence of 
arguers, audiences and opponents. The strongest arguments and claims are most 
successful and therefore also the ones that will find the most acceptance from 
audiences and opponents and will be repeated on other occasions.  
 A number of us will probably know this idea from its use in critical 
rationalism. During the 20th century, critical rationalism adopted it for philosophy of 
science and epistemology. In reaction to the insight that it is impossible to 
sufficiently justify any claim with empirical content, critical rationalism turned away 
from this attempt.6 Instead of aiming at sufficient justification, critical rationalists 
suggested ongoing “critical examination” that exposes every claim to ongoing 
criticism by testing it with experiments or by “critical discussion” with the “help of 
rational argument.” (Albert, 1985 p. 46) Claims or theories that have survived the 
testing can be considered to be more reliable than those that have not been 
subjected to such examination. The idea that critical examination can be used to 
generate a selection of the best claims can be transferred to argumentation theory. 
Sylvia Burrow summarizes this as follows: “(…) the best way of evaluating claims 
objectively (…) is to subject those claims to the strongest or most extreme 
opposition.” (Burrow, 2010, p.238)7  
However, because the principle is used in argumentation theory, and because 
arguments often are justification for claims, the principle of critical examination is 
not used to replace the principle of justification. Instead, the idea is to combine 
critical examination with justification: A claim is justified by arguments and 
critically examined with arguments against it. At the same time, the arguments too 
are being critically examined and justified. This way, the survival of the fittest is not 
restricted to claims, it also is supposed to apply to justifications (arguments). 
In this setting, the ideal instance of argumentation consists of moves that 
attack or defend one or more claims. This ideal of argumentation is therefore widely 
called the adversarial ideal of argumentation. If it is achieved, then the result is 
supposed to be that bad arguments (like bad claims in critical rationalism) get 
refuted while good ones survive. Believing claims justified by such good (surviving) 
arguments leads to a better epistemic state than believing claims justified only by 
bad or untested arguments.8  
                                                        
6 That is impossible to justify a claim with empirical content sufficiently is shown in the 
“Muenchhausen Trilemma”.Hans Albert described the Muenchhausen Trilemma in his book “Treatise 
on Critical Reason”. As every premise in a justification has to be justified in turn (and as it is not 
possible to deduce statements with empirical content from analytical statements that would not need 
such justification), the attempt to sufficiently justify any claim with empirical content will end in 1) 
an infinite regress of justifications or 2) a logical circle, using as justification one of those statements 
that already proved to be in need for justification earlier or 3) a breaking-off of the process of 
justification that involves “an arbitrary suspension of the principle of sufficient justification” (Albert, 
1985, p. 18). 
7 There are other conceptions of the adversarial form of argumentation (that include rudeness, nit-
picking etc.) I am here not talking about these conceptions – they have been rightly criticised and I 
see no easy way to generate virtues that would promote such forms of argumentation. 
8 As was pointed out and criticised by Janice Moulton (Moulton, 1983), the adversarial ideal of 
argumentation, like critical rationalism, also included the idea that arguments should primarily be 
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3.2 The cooperative ideal of argumentation 
 
The lack of cooperation is the adversarial ideal’s greatest disadvantage and it has 
been widely criticised for this lack. The conviction of its critics is that knowledge 
cannot be furthered if new ideas get shot down as violently and fast as possible. One 
of the most sophisticated criticisms of the adversarial ideal was presented by Janice 
Moulton. She diagnoses that the idea of exposing arguments and ideas to the 
strongest opposition possible entails that they are also presented and written as 
addressing such opponents. (Moulton, 1983, p. 153) This can prevent such 
arguments from being adequately developed, or ideas from being presented with all 
their implications, because too much time is spent immunizing underdeveloped 
theories from counterexamples or criticism. (Ibid. p. 155) As the only aim of the 
adversary method is to show that the argument or claim of another is wrong and 
one’s own is right, it is secondary to understand the possible merits of these 
arguments or ideas fully (Ibid. p. 160/161) or to work on making the other realize 
problems his ideas have (Ibid. p. 156) and to help developing the proposed 
arguments, claims and ideas further so that their problems might be solved in a 
constructive way (Ibid. p. 161/162). In addition, such an ideal might supress 
attempts to integrate others arguments into one’s own position, to understand 
criticism as helpful and to use other’s thoughts as the stepping stones for one’s own. 
At the very extreme, Daniel Cohen concern that the adversarial ideal might lead to 
the attitude to never be convinced by anything might come true. (Cohen, 1995, p. 
182) All in all, we can say that the problem of the adversarial approach is that it 
represses a strive for understanding another’s position, for developing a position in 
order to fully see its merits and for reasoning with the author of an argument 
instead of against him (this last formulation is taken from Cohen, 1995, p. 182). 
For these reasons, one might endorse the cooperative ideal of argumentation 
instead of the adversarial one. It answers the evolutionary idea of adversarial 
argumentation by pointing out that it will not be possible to see the real strength of 
a claim or argument if it is being slaughtered before it reaches even near its full 
potential. Therefore, it asks arguers to develop the attitude of teachers and students 
and to learn from each other’s perspectives and ideas, striving to nurture each claim 
and argument to its strongest possible form, correcting their weak points and 
furthering whatever helpful it is they can bring to the table. If this is achieved, then 
the result is supposed to be that the consideration of a multitude of fully developed 
arguments and claims will enable each arguer to gain the best possible belief system 
by integrating all those points that convince him. 
However, we should not be fooled by the fact that the cooperative model of 
argumentation has developed as an answer to what was perceived as the 
dominating adversarial model. That it has risen out of criticisms of the adversarial 
model does not mean that it cannot be criticised itself. Proponents of the adversarial 
                                                                                                                                                                     
deductive. However, this part of the adversarial ideal should – at least in argumentation theory – by 
now not play a big role anymore. 
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model could point out that the weak points of claims and arguments might not be 
found if the sole purpose of an arguer is to help develop each claim as fast as 
possible. Some things, they might say, are simply wrong, misguided or practically 
disadvantageous, and it is necessary that that is pointed out. Adopting the metaphor 
of the child, they could say that a child raised only with encouragement and praise 
but without correction will grow up to be just as worthless as one that has ever only 
experienced the harshness of the world. 
We are therefore faced with two different ideals, each of which can present 
strong arguments in their favour and each of which can be legitimately criticised. If 
we think that both sets of arguments have their own worth – and I do think that – 
and if we therefore do not want to give up any of these two ideals completely – and I 
do not want that – then we are faced with a problem. And this situation gets worse, 
not better, when we ask ourselves which virtues these two ideals would promote for 
the arguer. 
 
4 THE “CONFLICT PROBLEM” AND PRACTICAL WISDOM 
 
4.1 Contrary Virtues  
 
Let us think about the virtues the perfect adversarial arguer would have for a 
moment and then look at those we can imagine the cooperative arguer would need. 
First we imagine the adversarial arguer in all her possible glory. She is a 
fighter, perhaps even a knight for her truth and she defends it with all honourable 
means. She will have similar virtues as the lawyer: Ambitious, self-confident, 
aggressive, determined, and thorough in preparing her own argument and in 
examining others for weaknesses. As her own argument’s defender, she will be loyal 
to her beliefs, only changing them when she finds herself defeated (she has to 
defend them against the attacks of others if they are to survive longer than their first 
mentioning) and critical with the objections of others (for they could be fallacious 
themselves). At the same time, she presents her arguments as clear and structured 
as possible, displaying their strength without the use of rhetorical means (as these 
might hinder a full sight of possible weaknesses – which would limit the 
effectiveness of the fight for survival). As the opponent of another, she is forceful in 
her criticism and thorough in her search for errors. At the same time, she disregards 
ornamental additions in the arguments of others (they are not part of the 
argumentative core). All this is necessary, for if the adversarial ideal is to work, 
every argument and claim needs as good a defender as it needs determined 
attackers.  
Now we paint against that the picture of the cooperative arguer. He might be 
ambitious, but he is humble because he is aware of the possible weaknesses in his 
argument and helpful towards others in their arguments. When presenting his own 
arguments, he is imaginative in his use of language because his first goal is to make 
himself understood by others. At the same time, he will be prepared to easily change 
his own beliefs according to the insight of the arguments of others, even if they are 
not conclusive. When dealing with the arguments of others, he handles their claims 
and believes with care so that he will not endanger what might be of value in them. 
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He carefully considers every use of language in the arguments of others because it 
might help him to understand a new point of view. These character traits are 
necessary for the cooperative ideal to work, because the whole system can only 
further knowledge if everybody is determined to understand one another as well as 
possible. 
The two arguers I have described are certainly extremes, and I do not claim 
to have given images of them that are right to the last detail, but it might have 
become obvious that the excellent adversarial arguer might not be the good 
cooperative one, and the other way around. While the adversarial arguer is her 
claim’s lawyer and the prosecutor of the claim of others, the cooperative one is his 
claim’s teacher. While the cooperative arguer sees himself as the constant student of 
other arguers, the adversarial understands herself to be a defender against them. 
This leaves us in a peculiar situation. The first reaction to having two ideals, 
each of which has good arguments in favour of it and each of which seems to 
promote those advantages that the other ones lacks, should be to try and combine 
the two. However, that might be difficult: Imagine, for example, a situation in which 
an arguer find herself confronted with opposition to her argument. How should she 
react? According the adversarial ideal, she should search for weak points in the 
objections presented to her, trying to protect her claim and argument. According to 
the cooperative ideal, she should try and find a way to incorporate the criticism by 
changing her argument. Or think of the situation in which an arguer has to deal with 
another’s argument. The adversarial ideal would tell him to search for this 
argument’s weaknesses in order to test its stability. The cooperative ideal wants him 
to search for its strengths to promote them further.  
It seems as if there will be many situations in which behaving according to 
the adversarial virtues will yield contrary results than behaving according to the 
cooperative virtues. 
 
4.2 The “Conflict Problem” and Practical Wisdom 
 
What we are dealing with is what virtue ethicists like to call the “conflict problem”. 
(Hursthouse, 2003/2012, in: Stanford Encyclopedia) The conflict problem appears 
whenever two virtues seem to apply to the same situation and seem to require the 
actor to behave in very different ways. Fortunately, there is a standard answer to 
the conflict problem: To deny that such conflicts really ever appear, or better: To 
deny that such conflicts really ever are true conflicts. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy informs us that “a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in 
question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this 
particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule 
outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it.” (Hursthouse, 
2003/2012 in: Stanford Encyclopedia) Of course, we have before us a multiplied 
conflict problem, with dilemmas lurking around every corner – because the 
adversarial and the cooperative ideal of argumentation imply such different ideas of 
how the ideal arguer looks like. Fortunately, the situation to which the adversarial 
and the cooperative virtues apply is also highly diverse and it can be argued that one 
instance of argumentation actually consists of a number of situations that are 
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different in many relevant ways. All we need then is practical wisdom, and we will 
be able to solve our problem. But – what is practical wisdom?  
Practical wisdom, or prudence, is the virtue of decision making. According to 
Deverette’s introduction to prudence and practical wisdom, the prudent person 
needs general insights into human nature, ends and means relations and what is 
usually good or helpful. (Devettere, 2002, p. 115) In addition, he also needs 
experience with a great number of exemplary situations, for prudence is “above all 
concerned with particulars – a particular person in a particular situation is making a 
particular decision about a particular action (…)” (Deverette, 2002, p. 116). 
According to this information, practical wisdom has a twofold nature – it is a 
combination of general insights into the type of situation working together with 
experience acquired in a number of particular instances of this type of situation. To 
illustrate this point, we can imagine someone using practical wisdom in order to 
decide what to eat: He has to employ his general knowledge of which meals are 
generally healthy etc. and then has to take into account all his experience of the 
digestive and other effects certain meals had on him in the past when he was in the 
state he is in now (perhaps he is tired, especially hungry etc.)  
“Apply practical wisdom to find out which set of argumentative virtues to 
employ in which situations” therefore is a very vague answer to the problem we 
have found ourselves confronted with. However, we do not need to stop here. While 
it might be true that individual experience with many argumentative situations is 
indispensable when deciding which virtues to employ, there is also what Deverett 
called ‘general insights’. In the last part of this paper I will propose that there is one 
such ‘general insight’ that might help to solve the ‘conflict problem’ of 
argumentative virtues by giving a few rough guidelines as to when cooperative, and 
when adversarial virtues are appropriate. 
 
5 “DO WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER?” OR: THE ROLES AN ARGUER SHOULD BE 
ABLE TO PLAY 
 
5.1 When we do understand each other and when we do not understand each other 
 
The general insight that I think is so important that it can give us guidelines as to 
when apply which set of virtues is that sometimes we understand each other – and 
sometimes we do not. 
The adversarial ideal of argumentation seems to work best in a world where 
everybody understands the other clearly. In that world, the fact that it is an arguer’s 
only goal to win arguments will mean that someone will come up with every 
possible argument for and against a claim and the claim then will be attacked with 
the best arguments against it and defended with the best arguments for it. If 
everybody always knows what another means by the things she says, how the 
argument works that she proposes and on what background of beliefs a claim is 
made that she puts forward, then every attack will be appropriate to the argument 
and claim presented. However, if misunderstandings and undiscovered meanings 
enter the picture, the survival of the fittest argument will easily turn into the 
survival of the fittest arguer: The adversarial ideal of argumentation is, as we will 
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see, especially vulnerable to problems that arise due to the possibility of not- or 
misunderstanding one another or even oneself. This does not only include problems 
that arise out of ambiguities of words, but also problems caused by different 
background assumptions and different reasoning patterns. The most famous of 
these problems is that of deep disagreements that Fogelin introduced into 
argumentation theory. To illustrate the situations problematic for the adversarial 
ideal, let us take a look at this kind of problem: 
Normal cases of argumentation presuppose broadly shared beliefs and 
procedures of resolving disagreements. Participants of an argumentation must have 
a common belief system in respect to the topic of the argument at least to an extent 
that allows them to understand that an argument for a claim is could be convincing 
or why the respective other might find it convincing. (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, 
p. 6) If the participants of an argumentation do not share a belief system that 
extends that far, then disagreements can arise that cannot be solved by presenting 
reasons and criticisms. The belief systems the arguers take their reasons and 
criticisms from are so different, that one cannot acknowledge the others reasons 
and criticisms as such because he does not see how they contribute to the 
argumentation. (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, p. 8) The arguers do not talk to each 
other, they talk past each other, each of them feeling that the other is stupid, thick-
headed or just does not get the point. 
The ideal of adversarial argumentation by itself does not have any ways of 
dealing with such a problem because it does not acknowledge that such a problem 
might arise. It is designed for a world in which we, at all times, know exactly what 
we are proposing when we put forth a claim and what we mean when we presents 
an argument: The idea that belief systems will be bettered by submitting every 
claim and argument to the strongest possible opposition rests on the assumption 
that the argument faces this opposition in its best form and that the opposition is 
actually directed at the argument, not a weaker or misunderstood version of it. 
Unfortunately, to assume this is to assume falsely. That we understand each other is 
either lucky circumstance or the effect of deliberate work. It is therefore not only 
deep disagreements – rather drastic versions of misunderstandings – that pose 
problems for the adversarial ideal of argumentation. It is also simple 
misunderstandings, underdeveloped theories and different perspectives. If the 
arguers do not invest into understanding each other’s points of view while being 
open to seeing the merits of another’s argument, then such problems can mean that 
a discussion comes to an end prematurely or a theory is abandoned even though it 
could have been rescued. 
The cooperative ideal of argumentation is built on the assumption that we do 
not, from the beginning, understand any argument or claim fully but that every 
argument or claim is worth the work of developing it to its best form and give it its 
most appealing presentation. If we construct it to its most extreme version, then it 
rests on the assumption that a claim or argument that seems wrong or invalid is 
simply misunderstood. This ideal therefore has its greatest merits when we do in 
fact misunderstand each other, deal with underdeveloped theories and arguments, 
or need to learn each other’s system of background beliefs in order to be able to 
appreciate each other’s positions. 
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However, sometimes we do understand one another – and at some point, 
even if we did not understand one another in the first place, understanding is either 
reached or we have to get by on what we have achieved. This is because the 
outcome of most – and certainly the most interesting – instances of argumentation 
have practical consequences. Therefore, at one point, a decision has to be reached – 
to do or not do something, to believe or not believe that some claim is true. Then the 
cooperative ideal of argumentation does not promise to deliver the best outcome 
anymore because it does not permit to just strike certain claims or arguments down. 
While such an attitude is very helpful in the infancy stages of a theory, it becomes 
dangerous later on in the process. When the stability of an argumentative 
construction or the acceptability of a claim can only be preserved by making ad hoc 
assumptions or accepting what is unlikely, strong criticism is sometimes needed to 
weed out what is not useful anymore. If we believe that certain beliefs are false, then 
we also have to believe that certain arguments are bad, and certain claims 
inacceptable. When we have developed arguments and claims to their full strength, 
then we have to test them by letting them compete with each other. The risk in 
getting rid of all adversarial tendencies in argumentation is getting nowhere – or 
nurturing theories, arguments and claims beyond their date of expiry. 
 We can now distinguish two different argumentative stages, each of which is 
best served by another argumentative ideal. The first one of the stages (first because 
it can be expected to occur more often in the beginning stages of a discussion or 
dialogue), is the stage of striving for understanding. It is characterized by the 
circumstance that the arguers do not yet understand each other enough to 
appreciate each other’s positions. It is necessary for them to teach each other what 
they mean with the claims they put forward, how their arguments work and on 
what background assumptions they rest. Perhaps they still need to work on the way 
they present a justification that is not fully developed yet – or they want to change 
their claims so that it is better compatible with possible objections. The second 
stage is the stage in which sufficient understanding can be assumed. The positions 
have been developed far enough and presented eloquently enough for them to be 
fully, or at least adequately appreciated. The arguers understand each other’s 
standpoints and perspectives and are aware of the way each of them uses language. 
Now they have to test the strength of their arguments and claims to reach a decision 
about what to accept.  
Of course, in practice, these two stages do not occur one after the other, or 
can even be distinguished completely from one another. It will not be possible to 
record an instance of argumentation and then determine that from minute 1 to 5 the 
arguer were in cooperative stage, and then until the end of the discussion in 
adversarial stage. Each of these stages might have to be accessed at any point in the 
discussion to render the best results. Perhaps an arguer introduces a premise that 
no other arguer wants to accept but insists that they should. That is an indicator that 
the arguers should be cooperative for a while even if they have been arguing in an 
adversarial way up to this point. Or an arguer refuses to accept a conclusion that 
seems to be very strongly supported by everything he has accepted before. Whether 
a discussion is in the first or the second stage has to be evaluated by every arguer on 
his own at every moment of the instance of argumentation. That is the experience-
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part of practical wisdom and it would be unwise to try and set up rules that will 
determine when a discussion is in which stage. 
 
5.2 Four roles, two sets of virtues – one last word 
 
All this means that a virtuous arguer needs to possess all the adversarial and the 
cooperative virtues – he has to be able to play the lawyer for his own claims and 
arguments and the attacker of the claims and arguments of others on the one hand, 
and on the other he has to be able to assume the role of the teacher of his own 
reasoning and the student of that of others. All these virtues are necessary for 
furthering the Good of argumentation because all of them serve this Good in their 
own way. Only one set of virtues would be deficient, because it would enable the 
arguer to handle only one possible argumentative situation well. However, just as 
problematic is the assumption that both sets of virtues have to be displayed at every 
point in time. It is psychologically – if not logically – almost impossible to be at the 
same time and in the same respect aggressive and helpful, loyal to one’s claim and 
open for changing it. Instead, the arguer has to employ practical wisdom to decide 
whether the situation she is in calls for cooperative or adversarial behavior – 
whether she and her fellow arguers understand each other well enough to enter into 
competition, or whether this understanding has to be accomplished first. 
According to Deverette, the most important virtue in Greek virtue ethics was 
practical wisdom. A person who has cultivated all the other virtues but lacks 
practical wisdom will still act wrongly. No one achieves eudemonia without a 
history of good decision making, and practical wisdom is the virtue of making 
decisions well. (Deverette, 2002, p. 84) As we have seen now, this is as true for 
argumentation and the goal of bettering belief-systems as it is for life and the goal of 
happiness. While cultivating all the adversarial and the cooperative virtues is 
important, the ability to determine the argumentative situation and to decide which 
virtues should guide the arguer’s behavior is just as important. The arguer has to be 
able to play four different roles and to employ two sets of virtues – and he has to be 
able to choose wisely which one is appropriate at which point in time. 
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